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PEIRSON l\1. HALL, Petitioner, v. SUPEIUOR COURT OF 
LOS ANGEJJES COUNTY, Respondent; GERTRUDE 
M. HALL, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Remittitur-New TriaL--A partial reversal of that 
portion of a judgment from which an appeal was with-
out remands the cause for a new trial. 
[2] Id.-Remittitur-New TriaL-An reversal remands 
the cause for a new trial and places the parties in the trial 
court in the same position as if the cause had never been tried, 
with the exception that the opinion of the court on appenl 
must be followed so far as applicable; and this principle is 
equally applicable to a partial reversal of a judgment. 
[3] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-AppeaL-Where the appellate 
court in its opinion states that "the needs of the respective 
parties do not justify the amount of alimony here allowed to 
the wife," such conclusion necessarily rests on evidence then 
before the court. 
[4] Evidence-At Former Trial: Appeal-Reversible Error-Evi-
dence at Former Trial.-Without the consent of the parties, 
the trial court cannot determine the matter of the amount 
of permanent alimony solely on the basis of the record in a 
former trial, and to do so would be prejudicial error. 
[5] Mandamus-To Courts.-There is no legal basis for compelling 
by writ of mandate action by the trial court which should be 
obtained under established procedure not followed by the 
parties. 
[6] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-AppeaL-After the Supreme 
Court on a former appeal reversed a divorce decree insofar as 
the decree awarded the wife a designated sum per month for 
support and maintenance, the husband may not successfully 
urge that the wife waived her procedural rights by waiting 
more than five months after the remittitur was filt!rl to have 
the cause set for retrial and by not moving to strike his motion 
that permanent alimony be fixed by the court, where, during 
that period, he had equal opportunity to have the case set 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 683; Am.Jur., Appeal 
and l~rror, § 1218 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Appeal and Error, § 1760; [3, 6) 
Divorce, § 217; [ 4] Evidence, ~ 273; Appeal and Error, § 1553; 
[5] Mandamus,§ 36; [7] Appeal and Error,§ 1223; [8-11] Divorce, 
§ 179; [12-14] Divorce, § 198; [15] Divorce, § 206; [16, 17] Divorce, 
§ 211; [18-20] Divorce, § 207, 
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certainty created 
decree and the 
C.2d 
n1try of a f\nal divorce 
Anofoot;n that order, 
[7] Appeal-Discretion 
the record on 
of Lower Court-·-Presumptions.-Where 
does not indude a of the pro-
ceeding·s in on various motion,; were an 
abuse of discretion not be 
[8] Divorce-Temporary Alimony, Counsel Fees and Costs-Time 
of Award.-The court is authorized to make awards for 
temporary costs and 
ency of any action" for divorce §§ 137.2, 137.3), 
and an action is pending "from the time of its commencement 
until its final determination upon " (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1049.) 
[9] Id.-Counsel Fees and Costs--Time of Award.--The trial 
court, during the pendency of a proceeding to fix the amount 
of permanent alimony to be awarded the wife, has authority 
to award the wife attorneys' fees and costs necessary to enable 
her to prosecute her demand for permanent alimony. 
[10] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Time of Award.---An award of 
temporary alimony may be made after the entry of an inter-
locutory di I'Orce decree. 
[11] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Time of Award.-The trial court, 
during the pendency of a proceeding to fix the amount of 
permanent alimony to be awarded the wife, has power to allow 
temporary alimony. 
[12] !d.-Permanent Alimony.--In theory, alimony is considered 
to be compensation to the injured spouse for the loss resulting 
from the other's breach of the obligations of the marital rela-
tionship. 
[13] !d.-Permanent Alimony.-The right to receive alimony de-
pends not alone on the granting of a divorce for the fault of 
the opposing party, but also on a showing that the circum-
tances of the parties justify the award made. ( Civ. Code, 
§ 139.) 
[14] !d.-Permanent Alimony.-Despite his prevalence in the 
divorce action, a spouse may acquire no right to permanent 
alimony in the absence of a provision for it in the decree. 
[15] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Discretion of Court.-Undcr Civ. 
Code, § 139, the trial judge has a broad discretion in fixing 
both the amount of alimony and the manner in which it shall 
be paid. 
[16] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Award in Gross.-It is considered 
to be the better praetice to periodic payments of 
alimony, hut the court may also require the payment of a 
lump sum. 
Ort. 379 
[17] I(L-Permanent Alimony- Periodic 
payments of commence with the effective 
of the divorce but it is not an abuse of discretion 
to direct payment of permanent from defendant's ap-
pearance in the action or its eommencement, or to reserve 
to consider it at some time after of the 
decree. 
[18] !d.-Permanent Alimony ~-Circumstances to be Considered.-
The circumstances which tL trial may consider in fixing 
permanent include which has 
a bearing on the 
relating to the lives of both 
to a consideration of the ciri'U '!stances existing at the time 
of the original trial, when there is to be a retrial on such 
issue, would place an artificial a;d unjustified restriction on 
the exercise of its discretion. 
[19] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Circums::~nces to be Considered.-
N ecessarily, an award of alimony looks to the future, and in 
fixing the amount of permanent alimony the trial judge is not 
restricted to the consideration of circumstances as of the date 
of the interlocutory decree. 
[20] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Circumstances to be Considered.-
In a proceeding to fix the amount of permanent alimony to be 
awarded the wife, it is that the court will consider 
payments, previously made to the wife by stipulation and 
pursuant to an award of temporary alimony pending a re-
trial, in framing any decree for permanent alimony and will 
give such proper credit for them as may be just. 
PHOCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of I.~os Angeles County to hear and determine a motion for 
an order fixing the amount of permanent alimony. Writ 
denied. 
Irving M. Walker, James C. Sheppard and Sheppard, 
Mullins, Richter & Dalthis for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and William E. 
Lamoreaux, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
William J. Currer, Jr., for Real Party in Interest and Re-
spondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Peirson M. Hall appealed "from that part 
of an interlocutory decree which ordered him to pay alimony 
and the fees of Mrs. Hall's attornrys.'' This court ordered 
that "[i]nsofar as the judgment awards Mrs. Hall $350 per 
HALL v. SrPERIOR CouRT C.2d 
month for 
other respects it is affirmed.' 
436, 442 [267 P.2d 249].) 
it i;; reversed ; in an 
(Hall v. Hall, 42 Cal.2d 435, 
On the same day that the remittitnr was filed, upon the 
ex parte application of Hall, a final judgment of divorce 
was granted, incorporating by reference the provisions of 
the interlocutory decree, .Mrs. Hall unsuccessfully 
to have execution on the judg·ment issued. She then moved 
to vacate the judgment. ·while that motion vvas pending, she 
obtained orders to show cause why Hall should not be required 
to pay temporary alimony, costs and attorneys' fees "during 
the pendency of this action.'' Before the time set for the 
hearing upon these orders, Hall filed written opposition and 
gave notice of motions for entry of final judgment and for 
orders determining his existing liability, if any, and fixing 
the amount of permanent alimony. 
There have been no rulings made on the orders to show 
cause nor upon subsequent motions by Mrs. Hall for tem-
porary alimony and attorneys' fees. However, the final judg-
ment has been set aside upon tht> grounds tl1at it was void 
and obtained by inadvertence. Hall noticed an appeal from 
the order of vacation but later abandoned it. 
A minute order recites that the "Motion of defendant for 
Order Determining Liability of Defendant, if any, and Fix-
ing Amount thereof" came on for hearing and that the "Oral 
motion of counsel for defendant to fix amount of permanent 
alimony is argued and denied.'' Thereafter, the court denied 
a motion to reconsider that ruling. It also denied a motion 
later made to "reconsider its decision re: Liability of Defend-
ant and the fixing of permanent alimony''. and denied a 
"renewed motion" to fix permanent alimony. 
By his present petition, Hall seeks a writ of mandate com-
manding the superior court "to hear and determine the motion 
of your petitioner for an order fixing the amount of permanent 
alimony" to be paid to Mrs. Hall and requiring it to "desist 
and refrain" from hearing her application for temporary 
alimony, costs and attorneys' fees. But the record shows 
that the superior court has heard and dett>rmined adversely 
to Hall his motion to fix permanent alimony as well as three 
subsequent motions to reconsider its ruling. By his demand 
for affirmative action he is endeavoring to compel the court 
to hear a motion which has been ruled upon. 
However, the memorandum of points and authorities and 
briefs in support of the petition state that the order made 
1933) IIALI., v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
[45 C.2d 377; 289 P.2d 431] 
upon his motion to determine his liability for 
:JSl 
was erroneous. His is that the remittitur 
in Hall v. supra, commands the trial court to fix per-
manent alimony and that it has no to any 
other relief. 
[1] 'l'he and order of this court 
was a partial reversal of the of the 
which the appeal was taken, without directions. In 
action such a reversal remands the canse for a new trial. 
(Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 7 Cal.2d 547, 54!) 
[61 P.2d 756]; Estate of Pusey, 177 Cal. 367, 371 [170 P. 
846].) [2] "[.1\.]n unqualified reversal remands the cause 
for a new trial (citation), and places the parties in the trial 
court in the same position as if the cause had never been 
tried, with the exception tbat the opinion of the court on 
appeal must be followed so far as applicable." ( Ccntml Sav. 
Bank of Oakland v. Lake, 201 Cal. 438, 443 [257 P. 521] .) 
'l'his principle is equally applicable to a partial reversal of a 
judgment. (Cf. Pillsbnry v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.2d 469, 
472 [66 P.2d 149].) 
In Hall v. Hall, supra. the partial reversal of the judgment 
was unqualified, and the opinion in no way restricts the 
scope of a retrial of the issues set at large. 'l'he basis of 
the order was the conclusion that "the needs of the respective 
parties do not justify the amount of alimony here allowed 
to the wife." ( 42 Cal.2d at 442.) [3] Necessarily that 
conclusion rests upon the evidence then before the court. 
(Cf. Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., sttpra, 7 Cal.2d 
at 548.) lVIrs. Hall now may be able to present evidence 
tending to shovv different circumstances than those shown by 
the record in the former trial, and she so asserts in affidavits in 
support of her motions for temporary alimony and counsel 
fees. 
Hall does not allege, and the record does not show, that 
he has complied with the rules governing a setting for trial 
in the superior court. (Rule 6, Rules for Superior Courts.) 
Essentially, by this proceeding he is seeking to eompel the> 
superior court to fix the amount of permanent alimony without 
a retrial. [4, 5] But, without the consent of the parties. the 
trial court could not determine that matter solely on the 
basis of the record in the former trial. ( Blache ;_ Blache, 
37 Cal.2d 531, 53G [233 P.2d 547].) To do so would br 
prejudicial error ( lleinfelt Y. Arth, 4· Cal.App.2d 381. 384 
[41 P.2d 1U1]), and there is no legal basis for compelling 
382 C.2d 
writ of should 
be obtained under established 
the for the matter for trial may cause 
there is available to him a method 
the date of a trial. Rules for Superior 
Courts.) 
[6] The further contention is made that Mrs. Hall waived 
her procedural wa more than five months after 
the remittitur was filed to have the cause for retrial and 
by not moving to strike Hall's motion that permanent alimony 
be fixed by the court. !bat however, Hall 
had equal opportunity to have the ease set for retrial, and 
the trial judge was m that Mrs. Hall's 
failure to do so rc'Snlted from the uncertainty created by 
her husband's entry of a final judgment of divorce and the 
necessity of contesting that order. No authority is cited 
for the proposition that Urs. Hall waived her right to object 
to Hall's motion by proceeding to argue it at the time set 
for a hearing upon it instrad of interposing a motion to strike. 
In any event, all of these objections, at most, would be grounds 
for showing all abuse of discretion the trial judge in 
failing to dispense with the procedure required for setting 
the case for trial. [7] 'l'he record do<'s not include a tran-
script of the in which rulings upon the various 
motions were made. and an a bnse of discretion may not be 
presumed. v. State Board Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 
376, 387 [2G7 P.2d .) 
[8] Hall's petition for mandate also is directed toward 
prohibiting a hearing upon ::\Irs. Hall's motions for temporary 
alimony, costs and attor;1eys' fees. 'J'he court is authorized 
to make those awards'' [d]uring the pendency of any action" 
for divorce. ( Civ. § 0 137 .2, 137 .3.) Section 1049 of 
the Corle of Civil Procrdnr0 states that an action is pending 
"from the time of its eommencement until its final deter-
mination upon appeal." 
Sections 137.2 and 137.3 are a reRtatement of former section 
137 of the Civil Code. LentcT v. CmtTt, 38 Cal.2d 
676 [242 P .2cl :321], considerecl the authority of the superior 
court to a~ward counsel ft'"S and C03ts in connection \Vith the 
applieatlon of the wife for a writ of prohibition pending 
au appeal from au order of modifieation of the terms of a 
fiual decree of di voree to the enstody of the children. 
It was pointpr} cmt that "nnder ~retion 137 . . the phrase 
therein, 'when an aeiion for eli vorce is pemling,' embraced 
Oct. 383 
many diverse divorce action 
and arising after decree." (P. 685.) 
After several decisions awards of counsel 
fees and costs made the of proceedings to 
enforce or modify awards of alimony or to con-
strue the provisions of a property settlement agreement, the 
court concluded that attorneys· fees and costs properly were 
allowed. "On " it was "there is no difference 
between actions in which a woman is compelled by her former 
husband to resist by an appeal a proceeding brought by him 
to modify a custody or award and actions in which 
she is compelled to seek prohibition to prevent improper 
modification of such awards." (Pp. 685-686.) [9] The 
Lerner case and authorities cited support the contention that 
the trial court in the action has authority to award 
to J\Irs. Hall the attorneys' fees and costs necessary to enable 
her to prosecute her demand for permanent alimony. (Ac-
cord: Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 44 [265 P.2d 873]; 
Wilson v. Wilson, 33 Cal.2d 107, 1J5 [199 P.2d 671].) 
[10] Similarly, awards of temporary alimony made after 
the entry of an interlocutory deeree have been upheld. (N el-
son v. Nelson, 7 Cal.2d 449, 45a !GO P.2d 982] [during the 
appeal by the hnsband from an order granting the wife's 
motion to vacate the final decrPe J ; Ucrnard v. Bernard, 79 
Cal.App.2d 353, 358 [179 P.2d [pending a hearing upon 
the wife's application for permanent alimony made after the 
interlocutory decree but before a final decree] ; DeLeshe v. 
DeLeshe, 80 Cal.App.2d 517, 518 l181 P.2d 931] [pending 
appeal from an order modifying the interlocutory decree]; 
cases cited in Kellett v. Kellett, 2 Cal.2d 45, 49 [39 P.2d 203] 
[pending appeal from the interlocutory decree].) [11] By 
the same principles, here, during the pendency of the pro-
ceeding to fix the amount of permanent alimony to be awarded 
to Mrs. Hall, the trial court has power to allow temporary 
alimony. 
Neither Wilson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.2d 458 [189 P.2d 
266], nor Harrold v. Harrold, 43 Cal.2d 77 [271 P.2d 489], 
states a contrary rule. The vVilson case considered the effect 
of a failure to incorporate expressly in the final decree the 
provisions of the interlocmtory judgment relating to perma-
nent alimony. The rt~lc applied in the controversy between 
the Harrolds was that a final decree might be entered under 
the circumstances there presented despite the pendency of 
litigation as to the rights of the parties to the community 
384 r 45 c.2d 
court did not decide whether such action 
would be proper if an issue relating to permanent alimony 
i>; pending, or, if such a judgment could be entered, what 
its effect might be upon the right to receive either temporary 
or permanent 
An additional is raised by Hall as to the circum-
stauces which may be considered in the amount of 
permanent and the time when such an a·ward should 
become operative. It is his position that the portions of the 
interlocutory decree from which no appeal was taken are 
now final and fix the right of Mrs. Hall to support as of the 
time specified thrrein for the commencement of his payments 
therefor. Upon a retrial to determine the amount of such 
payments, he maintains, the trial judge will be limited to a 
consideration of the circumstances existing at the date of 
the original trial. Mrs. Hall asserts that all of the circum-
stances, ineluding those arising between the trial and a retrial, 
properly may be considered. 
[12] In theory, alimony is considered to be compensation 
to the injured spouse for the loss resulting from the other's 
breach of the obligations of the marital relationship. (Arnold 
v. Arnold, 76 Cai.App.2d 877, 885-886 [174 P.2d 674].) 
[13] But the right to receive it depends not alone upon the 
granting of a divorce for the fault of the opposing party, 
but also upon a showing that the circumstances of the parties 
justify the award made. ( Civ. Code, § 139; Bowman v. 
Bowman, 29 Cal.2d 808, 811 [178 P.2d 751, 170 A .. L.R. 246] .) 
[14] Despite his prevalence in the divorce action, a spouse 
may acquire no right to permanent alimony in the absence 
of a provision for it in the decree. (Puckett v. Puckett, 21 
Cal.2d 8:33, 841 [136 P.2d 1]; Howell v. HoweU, 104 Cal. 45, 
47 [37 P. 770, ,13 Am.St.Rep. 70].) 
In Hall v. Hall, supra, the portion of the interlocutory 
judgment dealing with permanent alimony provided that 
''the defendant pay to the plaintiff for her support and 
maintenance the sum of Three Hundred Fifty ($350.00) per 
month on or before the 6th day of each calendar month, 
commencing July 6, 1952; and until the further order of 
the Court. . . . '' Implicit in the judgment is the determina-
tion that the circumstances justified the award made but not 
that Mrs. Hall was entitled to some other, undisclosed, amount 
in the event of a retrial upon that issue. Hall's appeal from 
"that part of the judgment ... rendered in favor of plain-
tiff Gertrude M. Hall, awarding said plaintiff 'rhree Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month for her support and 
385 
of the evi-
circumstances 
not decide nor inf{>r that 
other circumstances which 
be found for no amount for support and main-
tenance. 
[15] Under section 139 of the Civil the trial judge 
has a broad discretion in both the amount of alimony 
and the manner in which it shall be paid. [16] It is con-
sidered to be the better to periodic payments 
(see Tremper v. 39 Cal.App. 62. 65 [177 P. 868] ), 
but the court may also require the payment of a lump sum. 
(Honey v. Honey, 60 Cal.App. 762 [2]4 P. 250].) The 
only limitations placed the section upon the time in which 
the order for support shall be are that the allow-
ance must be made to a spouse "for his or her life; or for 
such shorter period a" th0 court rnay deem ''; also that 
the allowance terminates "upoll tlw death of the obligor or 
upon the remarriage of the other party." [17] Generally, 
periodic payments commence with the effective date of the 
decree; but it is not an abuse of discretion to direct payment 
of permanent alimony "from the appearance of the defendant 
in the action, or from its commencement" v. Sharon, 
75 Cal. 1, 46 [16 P. 345]), or to reserve jurisniction to con-
sider it at some time after entry of the judgment of divorce. 
(See McCaleb v. McCaleb, 177 CaL 147, 149 [169 P. 1023] .) 
[18] The circumstances which the trial judge may consider 
in fixing permanent alimony include ''practically everything 
which has a bearing upon the present and pros-
pective matters relating to the lives of both parties." (Hall v. 
Hall, supra, 42 Cal.2d 442.) 'ro limit the court to a consid-
eration of the circumstances existing at the time of the original 
trial would place an artificial and wholly unjustified restric-
tion upon the exercise of his discretion. [19] Necessarily, 
an award of alimony looks to the future. Unquestionably, if 
the trial judge Wt're to fix alimony as of the date of the 
interlocutory decree without considering the presently exist-
ing circumstances he ;yould b~" r'n i itled to consider them in 
connection with a possible modifieation of the award. To 
45 C.2d-l3 
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restrict him in the manner suggested by Hall could result 
m modification proceeding. 
[20] Finally, some concern is expressed that payments 
previously made to Mrs Hall by stipulation and pursuant to 
an award of temporary alimony pending a retrial may overlap 
those required under an award of permanent alimony. It is 
to be presumed that the court will consider such payments 
in framing any decree for permanent alimony and give such 
proper credit for them as may be just. 
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ 
denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandate 
here. I do not agree, however, with the holding therein that 
the trial court, in fixing the amount of permanent alimony, 
should not be limited to a consideration of the circumstances 
existing at the time the interlocutory decree of divorce was 
granted. 
Section 139 of the Civil Code provides that the trial court 
may make such suitable allowance to the wife as the court 
may ''deem just, having regard to the circumstances of the 
parties respectively; and the court may from time to time 
modify its orders in these respects .... " In Hall v. Hall, 
42 Cal.2d 435 [267 P.2d 249], we reversed the judgment of 
the trial court insofar as it awarded Mrs. Hall $350 per 
month for her support and maintenance. Such a reversal 
set the matter of permanent alimony at large and remanded 
that part of the cause for a new trial. On the retrial of 
the amount of alimony to be awarded, I see no escape from 
the conclusion that the trial court is limited to a consideration 
of the circumstances of the parties as they existed at the time 
the original award was made. We held that the amount 
awarded to Mrs. Hall at that time constituted an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court under the facts then 
prevailing. The code provides that the court may, from time 
to time, modify its orders with respect to the support provi-
sions made by it. The modification must, however, be made 
upon a proper showing (Bradley v. Bradley, 40 Cal.App. 
638 [181 P. 237]) that conditions have changed since the 
entry of the initial order (Grant v. Grant, 52 CaLApp.2d 359 
[126 P.2d 130]; Triest v. Triest, 67 Cal.App.2d 320 [154 
Oct. HALL V. SUPERIOR COURT 
[45 C.2d 377; 289 P.2d 43ll 
387 
P.2d 2]) ; and such facts as have arisen or have become 
known to the party since the entry of the decree may be the 
basis of modification (Bradley v. Bradley, 40 CaL\ pp. 638 
[181 P. ; Ralphs v. 86 CaLApp.2d 324 [194 
P.2d 
At the time the interlocutory decree was granted and the 
allowance for permanent support made to Mrs. Hall, the cir-
cumstances then prevailing led us to conclude that the award 
was excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion. Since 
that time, Judge Hall, as a federal district judge, has received 
an increase in salary. Had there been no reversal by this 
court, Mrs. Hall, upon proper application for modification, 
might have been able to show that because of changed circum-
stances she was entitled to a modification of the prior order 
for alimony as to future installments. The earlier order 
would, however, have been final as to accrued installments 
(Zaragoza v. Zaragoza, 48 Cal.App.2d 27 [119 P.2d 162] ; 
Stevens v. Stevens, 88 Cal.App.2d 654 [199 P.2d 314] ; Steele 
v. Steele, 108 Cal.App.2d 595 [239 P.2d 63]). It seems most 
obvious here that on the retrial of the matter of support, 
the trial court must be limited to a consideration of the 
circumstances as they originally existed and that any modifi-
cation must be made upon a proper showing of changed 
circumstances and date from the time of stwh changed cir-
cumstances. This is not to say that a new action must be 
brought because to avoid multiplicity of suits, a court, sitting 
in equity, may consider all related matters brought to its 
attention. It should be clearly understood, however, that 
any increase in salary received by Judge Hall since the time 
of the interlocutory decree should not be considered by the 
trial court in its retrial of the matter of permanent alimony 
as originally awarded. If this increase in salary should 
prompt the trial court to feel that an increase in support 
allowance should be made to Mrs. Hall, such increase should 
not be retroactive to the time the original award was made 
because of the circumstances then prevailing. In other words, 
it is my view that an award of permanent alimony must be 
based upon the circumstances of the parties existing at the 
date of the interlocutory decree, and any modification of such 
award may not take effect until the date a change in such 
circumstances is shown to exist. The trial court may, of 
course, retry the issue of permanent alimony and hear any 
application for modification at the same time. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
